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Influenza A viruses all originate from
aquatic birds, which are their natural
reservoir. From this vast, ever-present
and global source they are able to cross
the species barrier and infect a variety of
hosts, including humans. Progressive viral
adaptation of avian-origin viruses to novel
hosts including domesticated birds, pigs,
horses, dogs, or humans may result in
widespread viral circulation and in the
establishment of endemic viruses in a
given population. In humans, influenza A
infections usually are caused by endemic
seasonal viruses and much less frequently
by animal influenza viruses that cross the
species barrier. A few times each century,
some of the animal viruses also gain the
capacity to sustain transmission among
human populations, resulting in a pan-
demic. By definition, any emerging pan-
demic virus will be different antigenically
from both human vaccine virus strains and
contemporary human viruses, and so the
human population will be immunological-
ly naı ¨ve to a significant degree to the new
virus before it spreads widely. To date,
only viruses of the H1, H2, and H3
subtypes are known to have caused
pandemics and establish subsequent global
circulation.
It has been shown that all pandemic
viruses emerging in the 20th century have
had an avian influenza progenitor virus
donating at least the haemagglutinin gene
[1]. Since 1997, most scientific studies
have focused on avian H5, and to a minor
extent avian H7 and H9 subtype viruses,
because these viruses have caused repeat-
ed zoonotic human infections and have
spread widely in poultry over the past 10
years or more. So far, animal H1, H2, and
H3 subtype viruses have been excluded
from international research aiming at the
development of pandemic vaccine candi-
dates. The rationale for this is that the
human population is considered sufficient-
ly immune to H1 and H3 viruses due to
exposure or vaccination against seasonal
influenza viruses. In addition, the popula-
tion over 40 years of age is largely immune
to the H2 subtype viruses that circulated
between 1957 and 1968.
There are significant antigenic differ-
ences within subtypes that change over
time as these viruses evolve, and this
requires a semi-annual review and fre-
quent update of vaccine strain candidates
for human seasonal influenza vaccines.
The degree of relatedness between the
strains contained in the seasonal vaccine
and the drifted strains that are isolated the
following year is assessed through cross
haemagglutination inhibition (HI) tests. If
the results of these tests suggest that cross
HI levels are low, the vaccine is updated to
include the most recent strains.
We reasoned that if a semi-annual
review of the antigenic characteristics of
human H1 and H3 viruses is necessary
due to antigenic drift resulting from
immunologic pressure, it was possible that
contemporary avian H1 and H3 viruses
would not be cross-reactive with contem-
porary seasonal influenza A viruses.
We tested by HI 30 human serum
specimens, obtained 3–5 weeks after the
administration of the 2006–2007 seasonal
vaccine, against A/Wisconsin/67/2005/
H3N2, A/New Caledonia/20/99/H1N1,
and A/Singapore/57/H2N2 to establish
serological titres to human influenza
viruses. We then used a selection of
contemporary avian viruses, namely A/
mallard/Italy/432-21/08 H1N1; A/shov-
eler/Italy/6965-6/07 H1N3; A/duck/
China/626-2/07 H1N8; A/duck/Italy/
3459/06 H2N2; A/mallard/Italy/6512-
69/07 H2N6; A/duck/Italy/3139-1/06
H3N2; and A/duck/Italy/6207/08
H3N6 as test antigens in the HI test using
both chicken and equine red blood cells
[2,3]. We subsequently selected the most
high titred sera and performed a serum
neutralisation assay in SPF embryonated
fowl’s eggs [4].
We found that HI antibodies present in
human sera, induced by vaccination using
the seasonal 2006–2007 vaccine, do not
significantly cross-react with contempo-
rary Eurasian lineage avian influenza
viruses of the H1 or H3 subtypes. These
results are confirmed by the neutralisation
assay. In contrast, antibodies in some
individuals over 40 years of age against
A/Singapore/57/H2N2 are cross-reactive
both in HI and serum neutralisation assays
with contemporary avian H2 viruses.
Results are presented in Table 1.
The results of this preliminary investi-
gation show that most of the human serum
specimens tested, regardless of their titre
against H1 and H3 human viruses, were
negative or exhibited only low antibody
titres against avian viruses of the same
subtype.
Interestingly, antibodies against A/Sin-
gapore/57/H2N2, present in most sam-
ples collected from patients over 40 years
of age exhibited a higher degree of cross-
reactivity with avian viruses of the same
subtype. It could be speculated that this
virus has maintained a greater antigenic
component of its avian progenitor since it
has only circulated in the human popula-
tion for 11 years (1957–1968) compared to
H3N2 for 41 years (1968–present).
These data show that post-seasonal
influenza vaccination antibodies do not
appear to be cross-reactive with contem-
porary avian H1 or H3 subtype viruses of
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influenza virus of the H1 or H3 subtype
could again donate the haemagglutinin
gene and form part of the next pandemic
virus.
While H2 subtype viruses are already
perceived as a potential threat, due to the
fact that the population under 40 years old
is immunologically naı ¨ve to H2 viruses,
the possible emergence of a human
pandemic virus with an avian H1 or H3
haemagglutinin has not been discussed to
any great extent. It is likely that our
preliminary findings reflect the existence
of a population of animal viruses of the H1
and H3 subtype that are very distant
antigenically and genetically from human
influenza seasonal strains and thus could
ignite a pandemic. Evidence of this risk
has been reported following cases of swine
H1N1 and H3N2 infection in humans
[5,6]. Recently, sustained human-to-hu-
man transmission of a swine influenza
virus of the H1N1 subtype across the
North American continent has disseminat-
ed the virus to Europe, Asia, South
America, and Oceania [7]. If this novel
virus continues to spread and becomes
established fully in the human population,
a specific vaccine will be required. The
development of any such vaccine would
have benefited from the generation of
knowledge prior to the outbreak, as
recommended for H5N1.
Although many of the public health and
clinical preparations for a pandemic are
independent of the actual virus, certain
preparations such as the development and
production of a human pandemic vaccine
system depend greatly on the specific
virus. Little is known about the antigenic-
ity and in vitro growth kinetics of animal
H1, H2, and H3 viruses since they have
been of scarce interest to the veterinary
community, as they only cause mild
disease in animals and are not notifiable
infections. However, a significant number
of such virus isolates are already available
for antigenic and genetic characterisation
in veterinary laboratories worldwide, and
it would seem prudent for medical and
veterinary virologists to work together to
investigate the cross-reactivity and pan-
demic potential of animal H1, H2, and H3
subtypes along with other recognized
potential pandemic subtypes such as H5,
H7, and H9. Such work could build
essential bridges between the public health
and veterinary sectors and improve pan-
demic preparedness efforts globally.
Preliminary data on this investigation was
presented at the closed OIE/FAO/WHO Tri-
partite meeting in Paris, 3–4 February 2009.
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